[2603.02961] Delegation and Verification Under AI

Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory arXiv:2603.02961 (cs) [Submitted on 3 Mar 2026] Title:Delegation and Verification Under AI Authors:Lingxiao Huang, Wenyang Xiao, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi View a PDF of the paper titled Delegation and Verification Under AI, by Lingxiao Huang and 2 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:As AI systems enter institutional workflows, workers must decide whether to delegate task execution to AI and how much effort to invest in verifying AI outputs, while institutions evaluate workers using outcome-based standards that may misalign with workers' private costs. We model delegation and verification as the solution to a rational worker's optimization problem, and define worker quality by evaluating an institution-centered utility (distinct from the worker's objective) at the resulting optimal action. We formally characterize optimal worker workflows and show that AI induces *phase transitions*, where arbitrarily small differences in verification ability lead to sharply different behaviors. As a result, AI can amplify workers with strong verification reliability while degrading institutional worker quality for others who rationally over-delegate and reduce oversight, even when baseline task success improves and no behavioral biases are present. These results identify a structural mechanism by which AI reshapes institutional worker quality and amplifies quality disparities between workers with different verification reliabili...