[2603.01574] DualSentinel: A Lightweight Framework for Detecting Targeted Attacks in Black-box LLM via Dual Entropy Lull Pattern
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Abstract page for arXiv paper 2603.01574: DualSentinel: A Lightweight Framework for Detecting Targeted Attacks in Black-box LLM via Dual Entropy Lull Pattern
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security arXiv:2603.01574 (cs) [Submitted on 2 Mar 2026] Title:DualSentinel: A Lightweight Framework for Detecting Targeted Attacks in Black-box LLM via Dual Entropy Lull Pattern Authors:Xiaoyi Pang, Xuanyi Hao, Pengyu Liu, Qi Luo, Song Guo, Zhibo Wang View a PDF of the paper titled DualSentinel: A Lightweight Framework for Detecting Targeted Attacks in Black-box LLM via Dual Entropy Lull Pattern, by Xiaoyi Pang and 5 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Recent intelligent systems integrate powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) through APIs, but their trustworthiness may be critically undermined by targeted attacks like backdoor and prompt injection attacks, which secretly force LLMs to generate specific malicious sequences. Existing defensive approaches for such threats typically rely on high access rights, impose prohibitive costs, and hinder normal inference, rendering them impractical for real-world scenarios. To solve these limitations, we introduce DualSentinel, a lightweight and unified defense framework that can accurately and promptly detect the activation of targeted attacks alongside the LLM generation process. We first identify a characteristic of compromised LLMs, termed Entropy Lull: when a targeted attack successfully hijacks the generation process, the LLM exhibits a distinct period of abnormally low and stable token probability entropy, indicating it is following a fixed path rather than making creative ch...