![[2602.14994] On the Semantics of Primary Cause in Hybrid Dynamic Domains](https://arxiv.org/static/browse/0.3.4/images/arxiv-logo-fb.png){kind=logo}
[2602.14994] On the Semantics of Primary Cause in Hybrid Dynamic Domains
Summary
This paper presents two definitions of primary cause within a hybrid action-theoretic framework, addressing the complexities of causation in dynamic domains where changes can be both discrete and continuous.
Why It Matters
Understanding causation in hybrid dynamic domains is crucial for advancements in artificial intelligence and rational decision-making. This research builds on historical concepts and offers new insights that can enhance AI reasoning capabilities, making it relevant for both theoretical exploration and practical applications in AI systems.
Key Takeaways
- Introduces two definitions of primary cause in hybrid dynamic domains.
- Establishes equivalence between foundational and contribution-based definitions of causation.
- Provides a counterfactual perspective using a modified 'but-for' test.
- Highlights intuitively justifiable properties of the proposed definitions.
- Contributes to the ongoing discourse on causation in AI and rationality.
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence arXiv:2602.14994 (cs) [Submitted on 16 Feb 2026] Title:On the Semantics of Primary Cause in Hybrid Dynamic Domains Authors:Shakil M. Khan, Asim Mehmood, Sandra Zilles View a PDF of the paper titled On the Semantics of Primary Cause in Hybrid Dynamic Domains, by Shakil M. Khan and 2 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Reasoning about actual causes of observed effects is fundamental to the study of rationality. This important problem has been studied since the time of Aristotle, with formal mathematical accounts emerging recently. We live in a world where change due to actions can be both discrete and continuous, that is, hybrid. Yet, despite extensive research on actual causation, only few recent studies looked into causation with continuous change. Building on recent progress, in this paper we propose two definitions of primary cause in a hybrid action-theoretic framework, namely the hybrid temporal situation calculus. One of these is foundational in nature while the other formalizes causation through contributions, which can then be verified from a counterfactual perspective using a modified ``but-for'' test. We prove that these two definitions are indeed equivalent. We then show that our definitions of causation have some intuitively justifiable properties. Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2602.14994 [cs.AI] (or arXiv:2602.14994v1 [cs.AI] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXi...
