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[2508.02766] The Generative Reasonable Person
Summary
The article introduces the 'generative reasonable person,' a tool for assessing how ordinary people judge reasonableness in various legal contexts, utilizing large language models to replicate human decision-making patterns.
Why It Matters
This research addresses the gap between theoretical legal standards and empirical understanding of lay judgments. By leveraging AI, it offers a scalable method to gather insights on public perceptions of reasonableness, which can enhance judicial processes and regulatory frameworks.
Key Takeaways
- Generative models can replicate human judgments in legal contexts.
- Findings challenge traditional legal assumptions about reasonableness.
- The tool provides empirical checks on judicial intuition and aids resource-constrained litigants.
- It reveals that social conformity influences negligence judgments more than cost-benefit analysis.
- The generative reasonable person could serve as a dictionary for reasonableness judgments.
Computer Science > Computers and Society arXiv:2508.02766 (cs) [Submitted on 4 Aug 2025 (v1), last revised 17 Feb 2026 (this version, v2)] Title:The Generative Reasonable Person Authors:Yonathan A. Arbel View a PDF of the paper titled The Generative Reasonable Person, by Yonathan A. Arbel View PDF Abstract:This Article introduces the generative reasonable person, a new tool for estimating how ordinary people judge reasonableness. As claims about AI capabilities often outpace evidence, the Article proceeds empirically: adapting randomized controlled trials to large language models, it replicates three published studies of lay judgment across negligence, consent, and contract interpretation, drawing on nearly 10,000 simulated decisions. The findings reveal that models can replicate subtle patterns that run counter to textbook treatment. Like human subjects, models prioritize social conformity over cost-benefit analysis when assessing negligence, inverting the hierarchy that textbooks teach. They reproduce the paradox that material lies erode consent less than lies about a transaction's essence. And they track lay contract formalism, judging hidden fees more enforceable than fair. For two centuries, scholars have debated whether the reasonable person is empirical or normative, majoritarian or aspirational. But much of this debate assumed a constraint that no longer holds: that lay judgments are expensive to surface, slow to collect, and unavailable at scale. Generative reason...
